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Thia paper considen the implicatiom of the abolition of border controL for the deaign of wmmodity taua
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dicontinuoualy. The eSect of abolition oa tases depende on the iateractioa of theae two effecta , snd may
reault in an increase in tazes, in contrast to the conventional wisdam. A modified veraioa of this result
óolds when countria aLo we ta:ea to manipulate the terma of trade. With a fized terms of trade, abolition
of wntroL alwsys leads to a welfare lau for both couatria; if the terma of trade an (pexeived to be)
íleyble, it 'v abo ponible that abolition of controls can raise welfare.
JEL Classification numbera: 321, 423
Keyworde: tax competition, cuatoma union, border controls, destination and origin regimes
This paper ie a revised version of Birkbeck College Diacnssion Paper in Ecoaomica 20~90. I
wonld like to thank anonymous refereea, George Alogoskoufis, Mick Keen, David Miles,
Stephen Smith, and participants in the Public Economics seminar at the L.S.E. and the 1991
Warwick University Summer Workshop for helpful commenta. Some of the work was done




Thie paper conaidera the queation of the deaign of tax poliàea within countriea that are
trading paztnere in a free trade azea or cuatome union, e.g. the EEC or EFTA. I consider the
tax design problem where in each country, a public good muet be financed from dietortionary
commodity taxea, and how thie problem ie affected by the preaence or abaence of border
controls. One motivation for pureuing thie line of inquiry ie that among the proposals of the
European Commisaion for "completing the internal market" , there are plaae for the abolitioa
or reduction of border controla, and alao correaponding changea to the VAT aad exàse taz
syatems ao that they can continue to function in the abaence of border controlel.
Many economiets argue that auch abolition of border controla, in an environment
where crosa-border ahopping by conaumera is not too coatly, impliea etrong presaurea towazda
io of commodity taz ratea below their pre-abolition equilibrium levele acrosa different
countriea , if these countriea aze unable to coordinate their tax poliàes. For example, Lee,
Pearaon, and Smith (1988), commenting on the likely eífecte of the reduction or abolition of
controla in the EEC after 1992, comment; "where countriee are left free to make fheir own
decisions about whether to move thtir tax rates more clostly into line with their neighbours, ..it
is clear that the outcome of such an uncoordinated process would 6e a tendency for taz rates to
move downward." Sinn(1989) says; "Unless the VAT rates are sufftciently harmonised, massive
waves of cross-borderpurchmes must be reckoned with.... The only way to ensure that, despite
the direct purchases, net oj taz pricea continue to 6e equated across borders seems to 6e a
harmonisation of tax rates.". There also aeeme to be a preaumption that such "taz
competition" ia necessarily bad; for example, Lee, Pearaon, and Smith(1989) deacribe the
poat~abolition aituation as a"fiecal free-for-all" and argue that the countriea concerned have
atrong incentivea to cooperate to avoid tax undercutting.
i'he ptincipal chaaga are the following. Good~ liable for VAT will no longewr be aero-rated for esport, but
will be ta~rable at the exporting country'~ rate be[ore crowing the border. The importer then reclaieru the
VAT paid in the utual way. Good~ bearing euire taza would ttavel under real, ta: free, until they reached
a bonded warehou~e in the country of retail. When the goodi left thi~ wsrehou~e for retsil rale, ta~c would
baome due. See Lee, Preaaon and Smith(1~88) tor more detaiL o[ the Commia~ion'~ plan~.
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The azgument usually proposed to support thia conclusion is what might be called the
conaumer~producer azbitrage argument. Suppose there aze only two countriee, a and b, in
the custome union, and tazes aze initially at their pre~abolition non~ooperative eqnilibrium
levele. Now anppose that controls are abolished, and country a lowere ita commodity ta: ratea.
Then ,two things will happea. Initially, consumer pricea in a will fall, and eome conaumere in
b(those with low enough transport~transactiona costa) croae the border to shop in a. Thie
increases a'a tax base. If consumer tranaport costa aze low, conaumer arbitrage will eveatually
tend to equalise conaumer prices, which means that the producer price in a will be aomewhat
higher than in b. If producer tranaport costs aze low, prodncera in b will export more to a,
again increasing a's tax base at the expense of b's. Both these effecta thus give a an increased
taz base which may be enough to offset the cut in taz rate. In the extreme case where there
aze no transport costa on either side of the market, tazea will be driven down to zero.
On reflection, however, this consumer~producer azbitrage azgument seema to be both
misleading aad partial. Moat importantly, it confusea the changes in objectives and
conatraints that occur when border coatrols aze abolished. Suppose for concreteneae that each
of the countriea a and b can produce both gooda 1 and 2, but that a(b) has a cost advantage
in the production of 1(2). Suppoae also that the pattern of production is initially efficient,
and that cross-border shopping ia costleas. What happens when border coatrols are abolished?
~~, abolition means that residenta of b will buy good 1 directly from a at a price equal to
the cost of production in a plus a's taz on good 1, and vice versa. So, part of a's tax on good 1
ia levied on foreign consumera, which means that other things being equal, the a's government
would prefer higher, not lower, taxes than in the case with border controle. Another way of
thinking about this ia to observe that abolition introducea negative externalitiea between
countriea: when any country raises ita' tax rate on the good that it exports, it raiaea the price
that residents of the other conntry pays for importa, which has a negative external effect on
welfare. Following Mintz and Tnikeae (1986), I call thia the privcte consumption esternality.
The eecond effect of abolition ia that countries face new constraints on ta:-setting,
arising from consnmer and producer arbitrage, ae in the conventional atory. SpeciScally, if
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country a raises its' tax rate on good 1 too high, at some point the conaumer price of thie
good will rise i r(i) above the cost of production in a plus the coat at which firme in a can
ship the good to country b, ~(ii) the cost of of production in couatry b. At thie point, it will
be profitable for country b to "undercut" a by setting a positive tax on the good which is
amall enough to induce the residents of country b to buy good 1 at home, thns attracting
customers away from country a and eroding its' tax base. I call this the undercutting
constraint. The severity of the undercutting constraint will depend inversely on both firm's
costs of exporting, and country a's cost advantage in producing good 1. If a is relatively very
effiáent at exporting and produáng it, it can levy a high tax on the good while keeping the
consumer price of the good below the ceiling. Thus, the effect of abolition on tax rates
depends on how the incentivea for higher taxee and the nndercntting constraint interact: in
particular, if the domestic country's coat advantage in a good is lazge, or the costa oí firma
ezporting are high, the tax on that good may actually ~.
There is also a further effect of abolition. The above argument has asaumed (as does
the existing literature) that the terms of trade aze fixed. However, in the above story,
country b's trade balance with a deterioratea by the additional value of shopping that b'e
residenta do in a; thus, abolition of controls may lead to trade imbalances. Then, - at least in
the long run - the terms of trade will move in response to thia imbalance, and conntries may
choose taxea strategically to manipulate the terms of trade. Abolition of controls changes the
way that the terms of trade depend on taxes, and so changes the incentivea to atrategically
manipulate the terms of trade, althongh it ia not cleaz a priori whether this will tend to raiae
or lower taxes.
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In this paper, I formalise these arguments using~ a Ricardian two-country,
two-commodity models. I make a more general asaumption than the one discusaed above,
namely that cross-border shopping (consumer importing) and 6rm exporting aze both
costly4, and look at effects of abolition of border controls on the taxea set in non-cooperative
fiscal equilibrium by the two countries for both the cases of fixed and flexible real ezchange
ratea. In pazticulaz, I am interested in how the private consumption extetnality and
undercutting constraint interact.
The main reaults are as follows. First, I show that taxes may be higher or lower
following abolition, for reasons outlined above. Second, the aeverity of the undercutting
constraint is shown to depend on the difference between firm's and conaumer'e tranaportation
costs: the emaller this difference is, the lower the tax ceiling and ao the lower the equilibrium
taxes. Thus, costless consumer arbitrage on its own is insufficient to compel countries to bid
taxea down to zero; costless producer arbitrage is also required. I also consider the welfare
propertiea of the tax equilibria. With a fixed terms of trade, the equilibrium with controls ie
constrained Pazeto-efficient and thus Pareto~ominatea the equilibrium withont controls.
Indeed, autarkv may be preferable to trade without border controls; the traditional gaina from
trade may be more than outweighed by the new conatrainta that countries face in tax-eetting.
However, this need not be the case with a flexible terma of trade: here, abolition may be
welfare improving. The argument is a atandazd second-best one; pre-abolition, tax rates ate
s
Then ia a tmall literature oa cooperative and non~oopetative taz daign by interdepwdent ta:
juriadiction~ in a federal ~tate (Mints aad Tulkena(1988), Wilwn(1988), (1987), Kerlove (1988)), aad wme
work on taz daign ia a customs union (Keen(198 )). However, the modeL uasd by theae authors do aot
compare difïerent regimu. The madels of Mints-Tulkena, Wilson and Kerlove apume that facton of
production are cwtleasly mobile and that croas~ordet shopping by coniumen ia pooible, whueaa Kxnawumes the oppwita The differmce in choice of asaumptions u that the fotmer cleaa of modeL are mainlyaddrmed to the proólun of ttate or provincial ta: design in the U.S. or Caaada, wbere Keen'a paper uezplicitly conceraed with the iaaue of ta: harmoaisatioa within the EEC.
~A ungle repreaeatative coasumer ia exh country, one immobile factor of ptoductioa aad conataot returna toKa1Q.
~However, I aaume that both comumer import cwta aad Cum ezport eo~ts pu unit of the good are ~mapreLtive to the eaL advaatage enjoyed by eacó country in one of tha good~ (aarumption (Al) bdow). Thi~
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not generally at their Pazeta-effiàent levels as each country usea ita tax instrumenta to try
and manipulate the terms of trade to its' advantage - in fact, on average, they are too high.
Abolition of controls has two effecta. First, it introducea the negative ezteraality ontlined
above. Second, it changes the strategic incentive to manipulate the terma of trade. It turna
out that this second effect may be dominant, which leada to a fall in the average of the two
taz ratea on the two commoditiea - although one of the tax rates riaes - hence increasing
welfare.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 1 relatea the origin and destination
prinàplea of taxation to the effects of abolition of border controls. In aectioa 2, I preaent the
R.icardian model. Sectiona 3 and 4 consider the cases of fixed and fle~àble terms of trade
respectively. Section 5 describes related literature, espeàally Mintz and Tulkena (1986), the
work of Grossman(1980), Whalley(1979) and Berglas(1981) on the relationship between the
origin and destination prinàples, and the recent work by R.azin and Sadka (1989) comparing
the residence and origin prinàples for capital taxation.
1. What Hanoens when Border Controls Are Abolished~
Here, I briefly outline the implicationa of abolition of border controls for the levying of
commodity taxea oa imports and exports. By commodity taxea , I mean not only sales taxee
on 5na1 wmmoditiea (such as exàse taxes on tobacco and alcohol), but also VAT. It ia useful
at this point to introduce the concepts of oriein and destination tax regimes (Whalley(1979),
Grossmaa(1980), Berglas(1981), Sinn(1989)). In the former regime, goods that croas natioaal
aze tazed at the rate of the country from where they aze exported, whereas nnder the latter,
exports are tax-exempt, and are subsequently taxed at the importing conntry's rate. Clearly,
if there are physical controls on goods crossing national borders, 'ather regime is feasible,
irrespective of whther it is firms or consumers who aze importing the goodó. On the other
maumption enaura that in equilibrium, each country producea oaly the good in which it Laa a comparative
advsntagc, which greatly aimplifia tbe analyais.
bPhe axception to thu iu aervica thst an conaumad in the "expotting" eountry e.g. by touriat.. If a Britiah
touriat eata a meal on hoGday ia Fraace, ahe muet pay the French rate of VAT on the maal.
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hand, if there are no border controls, the feasibility of the regime depends crncially on
whether goods are imported by firms (intermediaries) for eventual rpale, or by private
individuals for final consumption. If the former is the case, it is clear that the final commodity
can be taxed at the rate of the country to which it is imported, as long as the sale of the
imports is honestly reported to - or can be verified by - the tax authoritiese. On the other
hand, if the good is imported by an individual for private consumptioa (cross-border
shopping), the importing country has no way of imposing its tax on the good. The feasible









where D denotes destination regime, and 0, origin regime.
The current system of commodity taxation in the EC is a mixture of destination and
origin regimes, at least for importatipn by private individuals. For example, Danish residents
can (and do) cross the border to Germany, where excise taxes aze lower, to bny beer, withont
declaring it at the borderT. On the other hand, a Dane who bought a car in Germany and
transported it back to Denmazk would buy it free of German VAT, and then be liable for
Danish VAT upon importing it into Denmazk. However, in this paper I take the abolition of
controls to imply a shift from the dutínation to origin regime for cross-bordershopping, with
the destination regime stiU in force for imports by intermediariu: this seems a reasonable
approumation to reality.
aWhile this u cleu for ~ala taicn, it u Iw clear how the dotinatioa resime could continue to fuactioe fot
VAT without botder controL. Howver, the EC ha~ devixd ~uch ~~y~tem, the ~o--called "ckatias hou~e
approach" , which will allow this (~ee Lee, Pearwn, and Sauth(1989) or Sinn(1989) for mon detaiL).
TI am indebted to Morton Hvid for this interesting nugget of information.
3 The Model
There aze two countries, i-a,b in a free trade azea or customs union, eo there are no
tarifís on trade between the two countries. There is no trade with the reat of the world. 1
suppose that there is free trade in two homogeneous produced goods, produced by one factor
of production ( labour) in each country with a constant returae to ecale technology, and that
there are no intermediate goods. Labour is immobile between countriea. Let c~ be the amount
of labour in needed to produce one unit of good j in country i. I sssume that withont loea of
generality, that country a has a comparative advantage in the production of good 1 i.e. ci~c2
~ ci~c2. I choose units so that c2 - cb - c, ci - cz - 1, c~ 1.
Each country has a"mazket" for each good . Consumers in any country can buy on the
domestic market at no transport or Lransactions cost, but incur a coat of o labour nnita per
unit of the good bought if they purchase on the foreign mazket and import the good.
Similazly, producers can sell their good on the domestic market without incurring tranaport or
transactiona coata, but incur a cost of r labour units for every unit of the good they export
and sell on the foreign market. Thia cost structure embodies some atrong aeeumptiona. First,
it supposes constant returna to scale in the activities of consumer import and firm ezport,
whereas there are cleazly fixed costs in both these activities. However, allowing for more
general coat etructures would Icad to considerable complicatione (eee Minta and
Tulkens(1988)). Second, it supposea that costs aze identical for all conaumers and firma,
whereas in practice, there are likely to be wide spatial vaziations, with o and r being lower for
those who live, or produce, close to the border.
I assume that o, r are low relative to comparative advantage , or more preásely:
(Al) o,r C c-1.
This assumption plays an important role in the ensuing analyais: it ensurea that in any tax
equilibrium, production is efficient in the sense that each country only produce~ the good for
which it has a comparative advantage. Note that efficient prodnction rules out sntarky ae s
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tax equilibrium.
Finally, it is worth commenting on the role of these transportation costs. If o,r - 0
then producer and consumer azbitrage will drive taxes down to zero, so we need at least one of
these costs to be positive. However, from Section 1, it is cleaz that the central case of interest
ia when o is low relative to r, then, there will be cross-border shopping, and ao abolition of
controls will have real effecta. A simple - but misleading - way of modeling this would be to
set o- 0, r- m, as done in an eazlier version of this paper ( Lockwood(1990)). This would be
misleading both on theoretical and practical grounds. First, in practice, firms export coats are
often low relative to consumer's import costs. Second, it turns out that the tax "ceiling"
referred to in the introduction is essentially the minimum of 1~ and r-o; setting r- m, o-
0 would obscure this fact.
The prices in the model are as follows. First, wl is the wage in country i. Also, p~ and
q~ denote the producer and consumer price of good j on the market in country i, n~ of aay
transport and transactions costs. Also, t~ is the ad valorem tax levied on a value-~added basis
oa commodity j in country i. As there are four goods in the model, I normalise by setting wa
- 1, so wb - w. The main contribution of the paper ( Section 3) is analysis of the case where
the terms of trade are fixed, or are perceived to be fixed, so I set w - 1 where appropriate in
what follows. This is relaxed in Section 4 where w is endogenised.
(i) Price Deterniination
In this section, I take the vector of taxes ( ti,t2,tb,t2) as given , and describe how
market pricea aze determined as functions of this tax vector. First, by constant returns to
acale producers will be willing to supply wherever price net of tax exceeds cost, which is 1 or c
if aupplying the domestic market and 1f r or c t r if exporting. Then, the market prices will
be the minimum of the cost of supply of the domestic and foreign producers, including the
tax:
qá - min{ lftl, (c~}r).(1-Eti)} - 1.}ti (1)
qb - min { c(lfti), (lfr).(lttb)} - (lfr).(1-Ftb) (by (A1))
y
q2 - min{ I-Ft2, (c-Fr).(I~-t2)} - l~-t2 (2)
q2 - min { c(Itt2), (lt7).(Itt2)} - (itT).(ifcz) (by (Ai))
Next, producer pricea are simply conaumer prices deflated by taxea i.e. the revenne per unit
that a firm makes by selling good j on the mazket in wuntry i ig p~ - q~~(1-~t~. Finally, let
d~ be the cost per unit to the consumer resident in country i(including import costs) of
bnying good j from the cheapest source. This is
d~ - min{ q~, b~k.q~fo} (3)
where b~k is a border tax adjustment that is equal to 1 without border controle, and
(ltt~)~(1-}-t~) with controls. The inclusion of this term reflects the fact that with border
controls, the consumer pays the tax of the country where the good is pnrchased, bnt with
controls, the conanmer pays the tax of the country to where the good is imported.
(il) ('n~vmmvnt Pri(rrrn~etnnd B11dQGt i~O1t9tT6t7L~.4
First, assume that in each country there is a representative consnmer with preferences
over leisure, the two private goods, and a public good. To bring ont the egaential posnta, I
make the assumption that there are no income or croas-price effectss, and demand elasticities
aze constant and equal i.e. preferences aze of the following quasi-lineaz form:
x i 1-1~E x i 1-1 ~ E
( 1) -~ ( 2) f 1~ f a.Gl i- a,b (4)
I- I E 1- I E
where x~ is consumption of good j by country i's residents, 1~ is consumption of leiaure, and Gl
the level of consumption of the public good, where one unit of Gt is produced from one nnit of
labour in country i. The consumer in country i faces a budget conatraint
dThe as~umption of no cro~s--price effects is s strong one, but the model becomn notationally ~ery complez
if it is relazed. An informal dirawion of Che effect~ of relaxing it un be found in Section b bslow.
ln
di.xi f d2.x2 f wt.ll - wt, i- a,b (5)
where di, d2 aze as in (3). I have also assumed in (5) a time endowment of unity. Then (4) is
maximised subject to (5) which results in commodity demands x~ -(d~~wt)-E, i- a,b , j
-1,2 and indirect utility functions of the form;
' (di,wi)1-e (d2~wi)1-E 1
v -TÉ}TÉ-}.a.G,i-a,b (6)
I now turn to equilibrium conditions in product and labour mazkets. As ontpnt supply
is perfectly elastic, I only need to apecify how demand is divided between domestic and foreign
mazkets when the coasumer is indifferent between them i.e. when the two unit costs in the
min{.} operator in (3) are equal. In this case, I suppose the consumers resideat in country i
chooses to buy in the mazket that their government most prefers they bny ino. Now, let y~ be
the output of good j by firms in country i. Then the labour, market clearing coaditions in both
regimes simply require that the labour needed for production aad transportation of both the
public and the private goods in any country sums to unity, the labour endowment. (The ezact
form oí these conditions depends on the type of equilibrium, and so it is rather tedious and
unenlighteaing to write them down formally.)
Governments aze assumed to be welfare-maximising so their objectives are given by
the indirect utility functions in (6). The precieved government budget constraints in this
set-up aze as follows. I suppose that both governmeats exnect trade to balance at all
con5gurations of taxes and expenditure levels. Unless w moves endogenously to ensnre trade
balance, this expectation is non-rational away from tax equilibrium, but correct in
equilibrium. Then, the budget constraints (5), goods and labour mazket clearing conditions,
and the balance of trade give rise to the following perceived government budget conatraints.
oThu tirbreaking rule u cho~en for technical reaaons, to en~ure ezi~tence of a~trict Nasó oquilibrium ia
taica. Witó altemative eula, e.g. purcha~e in the home country in the ca~e of iaditference, an a-Na~h
equiiibrium un be ~óown to erid for any e~ 0.
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In the case where the destination ( origin) regime is in operation, the tax base for each tax is
the value of domestic consumption (production) calculated at prices ruling in the mazket
where the good is purchased. Explicit formulae for the constraints are specific to the different
types of equilibria, and aze given in (7)-{9) below.
3.Tax Eauilibrinm with a Fixed Terma of Trade
A tax eauilibrium vrith a fiaed ternes of trade is a pair of tax~acpenditnre vectors ((ti,
t2, Ga), (tb,t2,Gb)) such that for each country i, (ti, t2, Gi) maximises v~ in (8) subject to
its bndget constraint, and the pricing equations (1)-{3), taking the other country's
tax~expenditure vector, (ti,t2, G~) as given, but taking into account the reactions of the
private sector to (ti,t2,G~), and in pazticular, the decisions of consumers and firma as whether
to import or export respectively. (Technically, the two countries act as Stackleberg leaders
with respect to the private sector.). In this paper, I only analyae symmetric taz eqnilibria i.e.
equilibria with ti - t2, t2 - tb, and Ga - Gb.
I can begin with two observations that simplify the analysis of these eymmetric taz
equilibria. First, say that a(symmetric) equilibrium has efficient oroduction if good 1 ie only
produced in country a, and good 2 in country b. Then, from (Al) and (1), (2) it is dear that
any equilibrium must have efficient production. For example, conaider the market for good 1
in country b, and suppose to the contrary that firms in b supplied this market in equilibrium:
as lfr c c, firms from country a can always supply this market ( and a fortiori, the market
for good 1 in country a) more cheaply than firms from b, a contradiction.
This implies in turn that in any equilibrium, good 1 must either be imported into
country b by residents of b( consumers import), or exported to b by firms in a(fsrnu export),
and similazly for good 2. Thia implies that there can be just three types of eqnilibrium:
(C) - consumers in a (b) import good 2(1);
(F) -~Srms in a (b) export good 1(2);
(FC) - as in (F), except that consumers in a (b) re-import good 1(E).
iz
It tums out that the (FC) equilibrium cannot exist either with or without border controle. In
what follows, I characterise (C) and (F) equilibrium both with and without border controla.
This then allowa me to be precise about what may happena whea controls are aboliahed.
We aze now in a position to write down the government budget constraints for the
different equilibria. First,in the case with border controls,they are:
ti.xi t t2.(1f7).x2 - Ga,
t2.x2 i- tb.(lfr).xb - Gb ((F) equilibrium) (7)
taxafta a-Ga1' 1 2'x2 '
t2.x2 f tb.xb - Gb ((C) eqvilibrium) (g)
The difference between the two is that in the (C) equilibrium, good 2 is bonght in country b,
where the producer price is 1 rather than lfr. In the case 'twi hont border controls, the
conatraints aze obviously the same in the (F) equilibrium, but they become
ti.(xi f xb) - Ga~
tz.(x2 f x2) - Gb ((C) equilibrium) (9)
Here, the tax base is the value of production of the good the country prodnces efficiently.
(a) Tax Eauilibrium vrith Border Controis
First, I establish that a (FC) equilibrium can never eadst. Suppose to the contrary
that one did exist. Then consumers in country a would be re-importing good 1 from b at coat
(lfr).(lfti) f Q per unit. But by buying on the domestic mazket, they can obtain the good
at ltti per nnit, which ia a strictly cheaper, a contradiction.
The firat step in analysing the (C) or (F) equilibrium is to determine for which taz
rates consnmera can be induced to import or firms to export. Aa a(FC) eqnilibrinm does not
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e~ást, if consumera import in equilibrium, residents of a(b) will only import good 2 (1). So,
when will residents of a choose to import good 2 from b? This will be when the cost of doing
so, q2.(1ft2)~(ltt2) ~ o, is less than the cost at which it is available on the domestic
market, q2. Rearranging this inequality gives a~ r.(1-F-t2). A similaz azgument shows that
residents of b will import 1 if o~ r.(lftb). So:
consumers in a import good E(firms in b export good 2) ns a S(~) r.(Ift~
consumera in b import good 1 (fivms in a export good 1) a~ o~(~) r.(1ftÍ)
(10)
So, the governments of country a and b can induce its residents to "cross-border shop" or not
by setting t2 and tb consistent with these inequalities.
Now note from ( 10) that the revenue available to country a íor the public good
depends only on domestic tax ratea ti, t2, and domestic consumption of the two goods (the
tax bases). In turn, from ( 4) and ( 5), the tax bases depend only on di, d2, which from
(1)~3), depend only on domestic tax rates. Finally, I have just established that the decision
of domestic consumers as to whether to import good 2 or "let" foreign firms do it depends
only on domestic tax rates. Hence, welfare in a, va, dces not depend on foreign taz rates, and
so there is no interaction in decision-making between countries: each conntry faces a
single-agent decision problem. This makes the equilibrium very simple to analyse.
Now define the function
((1-Fr).(1~-t-~o)~1-c
r(t;v,r) - E - -t- ~.(1~T).t.[(lfr).(lft-Fo)~-E (11)
and assume:
(A2) I' is quasi~oncave in t, all o,r ~ 0, and t(o,r) a argmaz I' ~ 0.
t
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Assumption (A2) is very weak : all it requiresio is that e~ B~ 0, B-(a-1)~a.
Then, from ( 10) and ( 11), (8), and the commodity demands arising from maumisation
of (4) subject to (5), the ma~mum welfaze that ( say) country a can achieve while inducing
domestic consumers to import good 2 is:
vb(o,r) -maz I'(t2: 0,0) f max P(ti: 0,0)
a at2 tl
s.t. t2 ~ o~r-1 (12)
where the "b" subscript denotes the equilibrinm with border controls. By a similaz argument
(but using (7) instead of (8)) the maumum welfaze that it can achieve while inducing
domestic consumera to buy good 2 on the home mazket is
vb(a,r) -max I'(t2: O,r) -~ maz I'(ti: 0,0)
a at2 tl
s.t. t2 ~ o~r-1. (13)
Then, country a will wish to induce consumer imports (firm exports) as long as vb ~(~) Wf.
We thue have the following result:
PrODO81t10II 1
Aasume ( Al) and (A2). If vb ~(c) vb, there eusts a (C) or (F) equilibrium respectively. In
the (C) equilibrium,
ti - t2 - t(0,0) - B~e, t2 - tb - max{t(o,0), v~r-1}. (14)
In the ( F) equilibrium,
ti - t2 - t(0,0) - B~e, t2 - tb - min{t(O,r), v~r-1}. (15)
~oTo ~ee thu, note that BI'~8t - a.r.(ltr)~.(lttto)~.(B~e - t~(lttfo)], which ha~ a unique ~tationary
point where the tum in the puare bracket~ u xro. thu ~tationary point u u pwiti~e iff 0~ B~ t. So,
quati~oncavity requirn that 82T~8tZ G 0 eralusted at B~e e t~(lttto). But the rign of the latter u the
~ of e[e~. - t~(lttto)]let -(ltttoj1.[-1 t t~(lttto)) -(ltttoj1.[-1 t B~~), ., e ~ ~ ;.wfficimt for quass~onuvity.
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The fínal question of interest is for which pazameter valuea the two equilibria exiat. Note that
when Q- r- x, vb ~ vb. To see this, note that if o- r, t2 S 0 in (13). Then, from (11)
and (A2), azgmax P(t: 0, x) - P(0: 0, x) - P(0: x,0) c argmaz P(t: x,0). This means that
t S 0 t~ 0
(a,r) apace is divided as ahown in Figure 1 below, into two regions, (C) and (F), where the
two different equilibria prevail.
Figure 1 in here
A useful "base case" to beaz in mind for what followa ia when v is small relative to r. Then, a
(C) equilibrium will exist, and the tazea in thia equilibrinm will all be cloae to the Ramaey
taxes t(0,0) - 9~E - tr; the latter aze the taxes that wonld be optimal in the cloaed economy
where both goods can be produced efficiently i.e. at unit labour coat.
(b) Tax Eauilibrium Without Border Controls
As beíore, I begin with the conditione under which consumers from a (b) will import
good 2(1). These conditiona are q2 f a~ q2, qi f a S qb respectively, and reduce to :
consumera in a import (firnu in b export) good E as o ~ (~) (1 fr). (1ft~ -(1tt~,
cansumers tin 6 import (firnu in a export) good 1 as v~ (~) (1 fr). (1 tt j) -(1 ftÍ)
(16)
Without border controls, we also have to allow for the possibility that consumera in a(b) will
also re-import good 1(2) , after it has been exported by firms in a(b). The conditiona that
rulea this out is :
(lfti) ~(lfr).(lftb) f a (no re-importing of good 1 by a's consumers)
(1tt2) ~(ltr).(1-Ft2) f o (no rt-importing of good fr 6y b's conatcmera)
(17)
Note that consumer importation as in (16) impliea that ~g--importation ia never profitable. It
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is again possibletl to establish that there eusts no (FC) equilibrium.
We are therefore left with ( C) and ( F) equilibria. I aow eatabliah conditiona under
which the (C) equilibrium exiats. ( The analysis of the (F) eqnilibrium is omitted, as abolition
of border controls only has any effect if there ia crosa-border shopping - recall Section 1).
First, in a(C) equilibrium, country a ( b) raiaea no revenue from t2 (tbI). So, I hypothesize
tàat both theae taxea aze zero in equilibrinm. Now, from ( 18) and ( 17), country a has two
optiona in aetting ti. To see what theae are, coasider what happens to the taz baae of ti ae ti
riaes, other things being fized. From ( 18) and tb - 0, ae long as ti ~ oJr, b'e residents
continue to buy good 1 in a, so the tax base consista of the value of purchasea of both
domestic and foreign reaidenta. What happens in ti exceeda o-r? Then, a loaes from the tax
base all of b's residents who switch to buying good 1 domestically. Eventually, from (17),
when ti riaes above rfo, it will also lose from the tax base of ti ita m ti residents, who
will go to b to re-import good 1 back into a; when ti is above thia level, the ta: base ahrinks
to sero.
The two options are then as follows. One, it can chooae ti to maumise welfare aubject
to the ti S r-o, retaining the lazger tax base. Two, it can maumiae welfare aubject to ti ~
r t o, retaining the amaller tax base. The two conatrainte are undercutting corutrainta: that
ia, if country a aeta a taz higher than ( say) r-v, country b can "undercut" a by aetting tb at a
level which will attract some of a's tax base and raise positive revenue for b.
Using ( 11), the government budget constraint ( 9), and commodity demanda, the
payoffs from these two optiona aze :
liSuppase to the contrsry there 'v one, with ti c tZ - t~, tz - ti - t~~. Then (17) must be violated at thae
tu nta. But then fra~m (IB), reaideata ia country b mud also buy gaod 1 domatically , from the market in
wuntry b. Thus, the tu bue for ti u sero snd it raiw sero rermue. But then, by loweriag ti from t~ to
ths point where (17) holda with equality, wuntry s cm induu ifa raidents to buy good 1 in a, thus raisiag
positive revaaue trom ti , without affccting the reseaue raised from tZ (this Lut tact follows fmm aem
crosrpriu effeetr in demand). This change in ds tu rata thw unambiguously raiau xvenue aad lowen
the price a's eeridenta pay for gaod 1, w rai~iag rs. So, the hypothai~ed equilibrium camot be an
equilibrium atier ~ll.
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V~ (O T) - max I'(ta. 0 0) f a.ta.(li-tafo)-E e.t. ta ? r-O (18)nb ' a 1' ' 1 1 1
tI
vnb(v,r) - max r(ti: o,o)
ta1
s.t. tl ~ Tf0' (19)
s
where the aubacript "nb" deaotes the equilibrium with no border controls. Let t(o) be the
tax that maximises the ezpreasion in (18), ignoring the conatraint. Thie is the ta: that a
would 'í~kg to impose on ita production of good 1 in the absence of any tax undercutting threat
r
from 6. Note that if a ia not too large, t(a) ~ t(O,o) ,so in the absence of the nndercutting
constraint, country a(b) would like to set a higher taz on good 1(2) than it doea in the
equilibrium with border controls. This is because, as ezplained above, part of the tax falls on
exports so part of the burden if the tax is exported i.e. the privatt consumption externality.
Clearly, for equilibrium, we need vnb ~ vnb' ~d
thia is also suffícient. I have therefore
s
ahown that given this, there e~àsts an equilibrium with ti - t2 - min{t (o), r-a}, t2 - tI -
a
0. Furthermore, it can be showni~ that symmetric equilibrium ig unique if t (o) ? r-v, and
even if t~(o) ~ r-o, the equilibrium payofís aze unique. Formally,
t~The proof of thi~ i. a~ foUow~. Suppo~e therc were an equilibrium with t2 - tb - s~ 0. Then, from (18),
~
the upper boundi in (18) would be (r-v) t(ltr).s - q. Thea, ti - tZ - min{t (v),r-v}, and in
~
equilibrium, t2, ti generate no revenue. Suppo~e fint that t(o) ~ q. But Thea, by ~etting tl e~, e~
0, s(b) can induce its domedic mideata to buy good 2(1) at home, thu~ raiaing poutive revmue írom tz
~
(ti) , s coatradictioa. Nezt, ~uppo~e that r-o f t(o) ~ p; thea by ~etting tl - E~ 0 for e rmall mough, s
~
(b) caa again induce ita dome~tic reudent~ to ~hop at home, agsia a coatradiction. Finally, if t(a) ~ r-a,
wuntry a(b) can aever generate any reveaue from tZ (ti), w~ IeveL of




Asaume (A1) and (A2). Then, there exista a(C) equilibrium if and only if vnb ? vnb'.
Furthermore if t (o) ~ r-o the equilibrium ia unique, with taxes
s
ti - t2 - min{t (o), r-a}, t2 - ti - 0 (20)
s
If t(o) ~ r-o, there exiat a family of equilibria with ti - t2 - t, t2 - ti - z, ze[O,m),
where consumera in a(b) crosa-border ahop for 2(1) for all z, so all equilibria yield the two
conntriea identical payoffs.
Clearly, when o- r~ 0, vnb~ vnb~ but for r- a large enough, vnb ~ vnb' So, there e~ásta a
aet of parameter valuea for which the (C) equilibrium eusta, which ie a aubset of the
pazameter valuea for which a(C) equilibrium e~ata with border controla, as ahown in Figure
2. Note that the border of thia regime pasaea thongh the origin in o,r space.
Fignre 2 in here
So, for some pazameter valuea, abolition of controls means a awitch from a
(C) equilibrium with tazea givea in (14) to a(C) equilibrium with tazea given in (20). The
taxea on the gooda that the countriea ezport (namely ti, t2) change from the Ramaey taxes tr
i
to min{t (a), r-o}, and the taxea on the gooda that the two countriea import (namely t2, tb)
fall from poaitive valuea to zero. In the latter case, the undercutting effect dominates ; if they
were poaitive, the other country could "eteal" the tax base by aetting a lower taz. The former
case is more subtle and interesting, as there aze two opposing effecta at work. ~, countriea
have an incentive to raise the tazea on the gooda they produce efficiently above tr, the level
s
with border controla (i.e. t(o) ~ tr), as the tax is now levied partly on foreign reaidents -
thie ia the private conaumption externality at work. Second, the possibility of taz
nndercntting by the other country imposea ceilinga a~r on theee taxea which may force them
below the levela with border controls. In particulaz, as o,ry 1(conanmer and producer
arbitrage becomea more and more effective) , the undercntting effect dominates and tazes are
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driven down to zero. Note that ~ coatlesa conaumer and producer arbitrage are required to
drive taxee down to zero; costlesa consumer arbitrage on its own (o - 0) is p~ aufficient.
Finally, in the central case of interest, where (C) equilibria prevail both with and
without border controls, the equilibria may be welfaze-ranked. With controle, there aze no
externalitiee between countriea , and so equilibrium is conatrained Pazeto-efficieat; the taxes
in (14) or (15) maximise v f vb subject to (1)-{3) and (9). Thus, the equilibrinm without
border controls ia Pareto-dominated. At first sight, th19 Beema a SllrpriSlIIg reaIIlt: BfteI al1,
with croas-border shopping, consumera can buy at least as cheaply as they conld before, so
one would expect consumer welfaze to i~g, not fall. However, this is the wrong intuition: the
correct one is that the abolition of controls introducea tax externalities which conntries fail to
internalise. Indeed, it is posaible to ahow that this efficiency losa may exceed the gains from
trade so that it may 6e befter to prohibit trade altogether rather than aUow crosa-border
ehoppingi~. To see thie, let c go to 1, and r-a go to zero, while satisfying (Al) and vnb Z vnb
(thia ie alwaye poasible from Figure 2). For c close enongh to 1, the gains from trade become
negligible, but as r-o ~ 0, tazes aze forced dowa to zero, atrictly below their efficient level of
tr.
4. Taz Eauilibrium With a Flexible Terms of Trade
The welfaze result of the previoua section is rather disturbing, as it auggest that in a
second-best environment with distortionary taxes, "completing the aingle mazket" will
reduce, rather than improve, welfarei~. In this section, I ahow how the analyais above may be
affected by an endogenoua terms of trade, and in pazticulaz, that the welfare result may be
reversed. To coacentrate on the welfare effects, I make the aimplifying asaumption that:
13This reeult one of a clan of reeulte which show that [m trsde may be inferiot to autatky when there u an
initisl diatortion in the economy. Newbery and Stiglite (1981) have eetabliehed thie in the eaee where
ineurance marketa are incomplete; there, the argument is that iacreased income vsriability aawciated
with
trade can outweigh the treditional gaine from trade. It can aLo ariae with imperfect competition in product
marketa (Venablee and Smith(1988)) if there are traoeport cwte.
14~ practice there are, of couree, othu cwte arociated with border wntroL, euch ae paperwork, inaeaeed
journey timea, etc. which will be reduced or eliminated by the compktion of the internal market. Ther
cwt~ are not modelled here.
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(A3) c-r-foo,o-0
i.e. cross~order shopping is costless , but that 5rms in each country can only produce one
good (1 in a, 2 in b), and find it infinitely costly to ezport it directly. Thus all trade is
conducted by consumers i.e. the (C) equilibrium always prevails.
How is w determined? It is given by the trade-balance conditions , which can be
written as follows. Let country i's export of good j be e~ - y~x~ Then,
pi.ei f p2.ez - 0 (origin) (21)
qi.ei } q2.e2 - 0 (destinntion) (22)
This says that in the origin (destination) regime, the value of net exports at producer
(consumer) prices must be zero. The difference between the origia and destination cases is
due to the fact that in the origin regime, the tax is imposed on the producer, and so is in
eEfect when the good crosses the border. A ta~ eauilibrium vrith with a Rexibk tcrrn.. oj trade is
defined exactly as a tax equilibrium with a fixed terms of trade as above, eaxept that each
country takes account of the effect of its tax variables on w though (21) or (22).
(a) Taz Eouilibrium with Border Contro[J
In this case, the destination regime prevails. Thns, the government budget constraint
is as in (8) with the obvions modification due to the endogeneity of w. Substituting the
government budget constraint into (6) yields an objective
(lfta)1-E [w.(lfta)~1-E
va - 1 f 2 t a.[ta.(ltta)-E} wl-E ta.(lfta)-E] (23)
E- 1 E- 1 1 1 ~ 2 2
and vb is similar, ezcept for the snbstitutions of t2 for ti, ti for t2, and w~l for wl-E. A1so,
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írom the trade balance condition (22) and consumer demands arising from maximisation of (4)
subject to (5), the equilibrium terms of trade is
w - [(Ii-t2)I(lftb)1EI(I-2.E) (24)
Note írom (24) that from country a's point of view, a devaluation i.e. an iacrease in w will
improve the trade balance only if 1-2.E ~ 0, which is simply the Marshall-Lerner condition.
Then, country a chooses ti, t2 to maximise (23) aubject to (24) and country b behaves
similazly. Evaluating the first-order conditionslb to this problem at the symmetric taz
equilibrium with ti - t2 - z, t2 - tb - t, I obtain:
a-1 z~-E. -0
lfz
t (li-ta) dw t[ a-1 - E. ] f[ w 2. á].{(1-E).-
l~t dt2 1~{-t
(domestic wel Jare) ( strat egic)
(25)
- Z} - 0 (26)
The left-hand side of Equation (26) is made up of two effects. The first is the marginal
impact of an increment in ti on domestic welfare (the domestic welfare effect), given that the
terms of trade is fixed. The second is the indirect effect of an increment of t2 on a's welfare,
via the induced effect on the terms of trade. This second term measures the etrategic incentive
for country a to manipulate the terma of trade to ita advantage, and so I refer to it in what
follows as the strate ig~ effect. Equation (28) therefore says that at the optimal t2, the eum of
the two effects is zero. (Note that there is no etrategic effect in (25), as ti has no effect on w,
tSFor t,s aa defiaed in (25) and (28) to be equilibrium taze~, it u aLo that ca~e that they mwt be global
ma:ima af ra given ti e t, tz - i. Ai thcre i~ a unique wlution to the first~rder coadition~, it ~uffun to
check that the ~econd~rder condition~ to the problem are ~atiified st ti - t2 - ~, t2 - ti - t. The
condition~ required for thi~ are derived in the Appead'u, and are E 1 B and (A7).
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from (24)).
Looking at the strategic effect in more detail, it is made up of the elasticity of w with
respect to lft2 times the term in the curly brackets, which is the effect of an increment in w
on domestic welfare. Following Mintz and Tulkens(1986), I can aplit thia latter effect into
two parts. First, there ia the "private consumption effect" of an increase ia w, -l~a, which
measures the direct utility loss to consumers in a from the higher price of good 2(recall
t
equation (3)). This is always negative. Second, there is the "taz base effect" (1-E). ,
lft
which measures the effect on country a's tax base of an increment in w. R.ecall from (14) that
the tax raised from the imported good is t2.w.x2 - tz.wl-E(1ft2)-E, so the impact of w on
thia source of revenue is cleazly positive as long as demand for the imported good is ie inelastic
i.e. E c 1 and negative otherwise.
Solving (25) and (26), I get
z-B t- 0.(2.E-1) t E~a
1-~Z - E~ 1~-t - E 2
(27)
It is easily checked that t z z as E z 0. But the second~rder coaditiona to a's problem
require E~ B. So, t~ z i.e. the strategic effect is always positive in equilibrium.
(b) Tax Eauilibrium without Border Controls
In this case, as cross-border shopping is costless trom (A3), the origin regime is in
operation. As c- r- m, both consumer prices and government revenue aae independent of
(t2, ti). These tax inatruments are then "redundant" in the case without border controle and
so we may set them to zero in the discussion of the origin regime that followaia. Given that
(t2, ti) aze "redundant", I can set ti - ta, t2 - tb. Substitution of the government budget
constraint ( 9) into ( 6), using (1)~3) and modifying ( 9) in the obvions way due to an
endogenoua terms of trade, gives a formula for domestic welfare of
1eMore pmirely, thu u~aying that it is not fee~ible for country a(b) to t~ good 2(1).
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(ltta)1-E [w.(lttb)]1-E
v - t -~ a.ta[(ltta)-Et wE.(ltta)-E ] (28)
E - 1 E - 1
Also, solving for the equilibrium terms of trade írom (21), I get:
w - [(ltta)I(lttb)](1-E)~(1-2E) (29)
The problem facing country a is to choose ta to maximise (28) aubject to the terms of trade in
(29), taking tb as given. This differs from the problem in the destiaatioa case in two reapecta.
First, (as discussed above) the choice of tb has a direct external effect on v(and vice versa)
by changing the price that a's residents pay for the imported good b. Second, the strategic
effect will be different, both because the terms of trade is determined differently as a function
of the taxea, and because w enters differently in va, due to the different tax base in the origin
case. (Note that the undercutting constraint is now absent as c- r- m).
Evaluating the first-order conditiontT to a's maximisation problem at the symmetric
equilibrium ta - tb - r, I obtain;
[ a-0.5 - E. r ] t
1[(lwta)
dwa].{E. r -Z) - O (30)
ltr 2 dt ltr
(domestic weljare) (strategic )
Again, this is made up of the sum of a domestic welfaze effect and a strategic effect.
To compaze this to the destination case, recall first that when the terms of trade are
fixed, taxes in the origin case aze alwavs higher than in the destination case in the absence of
any undercutting threat, due to the private consumption externality. This is apparent in
r
(30), where if the atrategic effect is zero, the domestic welfaze effect yields r- t(0) -
(a--0.5)~a.E ~ tr. However, when w adjusts to bring about trade balance, and the countries
t7Again, as there u only one wlution to the firet-order condition~, it u only necmary that the SOC ~hould
hold at the equilibrium t8 - tb c r. This requira (All) in the Appendiz to hold.
za
foresee this, the atrategic effect comes into play, which generally differa between origin and
destination regimes. Note that the private consumption effect, -l~a, ia the same as in the
destination case, but the tax base effect is now unambiguously positive at E T. The reason
lfr
for thia is that from (18), a's tax base depends positively on w as long as E 1 0. Intuitively,
thia is because when the awitch from destination to origin takes place, imports of good 2
(which depend negatively on w) are replaced by exports of good 1(which depend poaitively on
w) in the tax base.
Solving (30) for the tax rate, I get:
T i~'.(ZE-1)}(1-E),.`
1 f r E(3. E-1)
(31)
where B' -(a-0.5)~a. It can be checked that as long as E 1 1~3, r z t~(0) if either E~ 1 and
a ~ 1.5, or if E 5 1 and a ~ 1.5. So, the strategic effect may give either aa upward or
downward bias to the tax. Thus, there are parameter coafigurations (e.g. E 1 1~ B and a~
1.5) where the atrategic bias changes sign from positive to negative following abolitioa.
(c)Comnnri~g Solutions
Equations (27) and (31) say that in the case with controls, the consumera of each
country face a tax vector (z,t) whereas without controls, they face a tax vector (r,r). It is
easy to show that as E~ 0, t ~ r 1 z as long as E~ 1~3. So, as long as E 1 1~3, one of the
taxes - namely the tax on the exported good - will be higher in the origin regime than in the
destination regime. Thus, the insight that (some) taxes can rise following abolition of border
controls carriea over to the case where the real exchange rate is flexible. The intuition for thia
result is simply the additional negative extemality introduced by abolition of controls, which
tends to raise equilibrium taxes, may dominate (or be complemented by) the etrategic effect.
However, if E~ 1~3, one tax - namely the tax on the imported good - mnst also f~ following
abolition. This ia illustrated in Figure 3 below, where t,z,r aze shown for a- 1.1, 2.0 ~ E t
5.0.
zs
Figure 3 in here
Now recall that as cross-border shopping is costless, the conatrained Pareto-effiáent
level of all the t~ ie tr. So, in country a, as e~ B from aecond-order conditiona, abolition has
the effect of moving the tax on one good (good 2) closer to z- tr, aad the ta: on the other
good (good 1) further away. A priori, the effect of this change on welfare is ambiguons.
However, some numerical simulations illustrated in Figure 4 below, indicate that welfare may
actually rise íollowing abolition.
Figure 4 in here
The intuition is a standazd second-best one. The equilibrium with border controle ie not a
Pazeto-efficient equilibrium relative to the tax instruments available (i.e. not conatrained
Pareto-efficie~nt), ae ehe external effpcte throuqh ahifta in the terme oí trade,w, are not
internalised when countries choose tax rates. Thus, introducing an additional ezternality by
aboliahing border controls dces not necessarily reduce welfare, ~ it offseta the original
distortion. In this example, the efficient taxes z- tr are rather low, whereas t ie very high;
abolition of controla replacea the two tax rates (z,t) on goods 1 and 2 respectively by the ta:
vector (r,r) where r is much lower than t, and so (r,r) ia "on average:' closer to (z,s) than
(z,t) is. It is important to note that the force pushing (r,r) down and thns improving welfare
is not the new externality, but the reversal in sign of the strategic effect from positive to
negative (note that the parameter values in the simulation satisfy E~ 1 1 B and a~ 1.5).
5 Related literature and Conclusions
There aze several literatures related to the analysis of this paper. The 5rat ie the
literature, lazgely initiated by Mintz and Tulkens (1986), on taz competition between
jurisdictions. They consider a model with costly crosa-border ahopping and two tax
authorities. The main differences between M-T and this model are the following. First aad
foremoet, firms cannot export directly, and there aze assumed to be no border controle, ao
that an origin regime is assumed, rather than determined endogenously within the model.
This meana that the effects of abolition cannót be directly deduced from their resnlte. Second,
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trade is balanced not by a flexible terms of trade, but by labour mobility. Third, there is only
one tazable good, but strictly convez transport costa mean that the residercta of any country
may buy the good from more than one country simultaneously.
They identify two kinds of external effect of an increase in the ta: levied by
country~jurisdiction i on country j, the "public consumption effect", and the "private
conaumption effect". The latter is preàsely the negative externality I identified above,
whereby an increase in i's taxes increases the price residents on j pay for (some proportion of
their purchases), which tends to bias the tax rates upwards. The former ie the impact of a
change in i's tax on j's tax base, and is related to the undercutting constraint.
The aecond literature is that comparing origin and destination regimes (Whalley(1979),
Grossman(1980), Berglas(1981), Sinn(1989)). Recall that when croas-border ehopping ia
costless, we have identified the former and latter with the casea with and without border
controls (see Section 2 above). From (1) -(3) above it is clear that the real allocation of
resources is in general, changed when a switch from the origin to the destination regime, or
vice versa, occurs, given tax rates fixed.
However, Grossman(1980), Berglas (1981) and Whalley(1979) among others have
ahowed that there are conditions under which a switch has no real effectata. These conditions
are: firat, that commodity taxes are uniform within each country, aecond that all factors are
inelastically supplied, and third, that all tax revenues are returned in a lump-sum form to
domestic consumers. The intuition for the result is simple; following a switch from origin to
destination, the relative wage adjusts to ensure that relative consumer prices in (2) are the
same as in (3) when commodity taxation is at the uniform rates ti - t2 - ta and tb - tZ -
tb respectively. More preàsely, if wo, wd aze the relative producer wages in the two regimes,
they need to satisfy wd - wo.(ifta)~(lftb). Aa labour supplies are inelastic, thia change in
1eSinn(1989) ha~ ~howa that whea coniumptioa goodi are ta:ed, but iavptmeat gaods aro aot, thm a changeaf regime will have real efiecb. Thia show~ that the resulh of Graamaa, Whalley, aad gergla~ requireuniforauty of taza.
the relative wage has noio real allocative effects (see Whalley(1980) for more detail of this
azgument). So, the results of this paper extend this literature by considering the effecta of a
regime switch when taxes aze chosen optimally by each country and without cooperation
between countries, and labour is supplied elastically, eo that the taz deaign problem is
non-trivial. I have shown that in general, abolition of border coatrols leading to a ewitch in
regimes o~ make a difference.
The Snal literature is that comparing the residence and origin prinàplea in the
taxation of income from capital, and in pazticular, the paper of R,azin and Sadka (1989). For
the taxation of income from capital, there are two polaz prináples of tazation: the residence
and oriein principles. Under the former, residents of any country are taxed on their
world-wide income equally, regardless of whether the source of income is domestic or foreign.
Under the latter, residents of a country are not taxed on their income from foreign eourcea
and foreigners are taxed equally as residents on income from domeatic sourcea. Under the
reasonable assumption that tax rates on capital income vary acrosa countries, it ia dear that
under the residence prinàple, returns to savers vary across conntries (savinga ineffiàency) ,
whereas the returns to inveatment across countries aze equaliaed (inveatment eífiàency),
whereas the opposite is true under the origin principle. Sadka and Razin ahow that if terma of
trade manipulation is ignored (í.e. each country believes it cannot alter the terme of trade),
tax competition leads each country to choose the residence prinàple of ta.xation and
equilibrium is constrained Pareto~fficient. This result is compazable to the regulta in thia
paper if the term "residence" is replaced by "destination". In pazticulaz, with a fized terma of
trade, the taxes chosen in the destination regime aze the constrained Pazeto~ffiàent Ramaey
toNote that when ta: ratu are fuced following the switch, and labour is supplied inelastically, but where taw
are non~rniform, the regimes can be welfare-ranked. In the case with border conttoL, from (1) and (2)
there is production effiuency, but conaumption inefficiency ( i.e. qa ~ qb). Compsring (3) and (4), howerer,
there is cowumption efficiency acroa countries (i.e. q- qb), and aLo production efluiency u bng u taus
are such that pZ C c2 and pb C w.ci . Therefore, under theu conditions, the abolition of bordu controó
makee at leaat one country better off.
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taxea.
FinaAy, it is worth mentioning some limitations of the analysis in this paper. One
important extension would be to consider a less apecial demand structnre, and allow for
cross-price elastiátiea. In this case, the externality created by abolition wonld be more
complex: an increase in (say) ti would not only increase the price that conntry b's residenta
pay for good 1, but would also change b's tax base x2 f x2. If the two gooda were subatitutee,
b'e tax base may in prináple rise by enough to offset the negative price effect. A final
extension ia to consider models of intra-industry trade with imperfect competition, auch as
Krugman (1979) or Dixit(1984). This was done in an eazlier version of thie paper
(Lockwood(1990)), where it was shown that an increase in the tax set by country a on the
(single) traded good could again have a positive effect on b's tax base, and vice versa, in
addition to the negative price effect.
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Appendix
In thia appendix, I show that the welfaze functions (23) and (2g) are have nniqne atationary
poiate and are quasi-concave i.e. the aecond-order conditiona for a marimnm hold at the
stationary point.
(a)Tax Equiliórium with Bord~r ControLs



















with q- E. These have unique solutions. For quasi-concavity of va, we need the Jacobian
I-i. E
of the left-hand sidea of (A1) and (A2) with respect to (ti, t2) be negative definite when
evaluated at the unique solution of (A1)-(A2). As ~1 is independent of t2, the crose-partiala
aze zero. Therefore, negative definiteness requires simply:
~I~Bti ~ 0




From (A5) and (A3), It is cleaz that (A5) holds if and only if E~ B. From (A8) aad (A4), and
given that t2 - tb ~-1 in symmetric equilibrium, (A8) holda if and only if;
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rlla-(1~)~0 (A7)
(b) Tax Equilibrium urithout Border Controls
The first~rder condition to the problem of choosing ta to mazimise ( 28) eubject to (29) can
be written;
a.(1~-ta)-E-~z(ta~ `p(ta~ tb)) - 0
where




n{i ' 1-E f w. E.(1-~ta) 1.}ta
(A8)
(A9)
where now n-(1-E)I(1-2.E}. For quasi~oncavity of va in (28), we need the derivative of the
LHS of (A8) to be negative at the solution to (A8), which requires
t3~318ta f ~318w.dw C 0
dta
(A10)
so from (A9), as long as t~-1, (A10) holds at the symmetric solution if and only if;
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